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This paper revisits the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth by addressing the endogeneity issue stemming from reverse causality and 
unobserved factors that has plagued the extensive previous literature on this subject. 
In our approach, we use the Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI) and country 
size as instrumental variables, which we argue are strong and consistent instruments 
for fiscal decentralization. Empirically, we find that indeed both instruments are 
strong and valid in the first stage of estimation and that on average, a 10-percent 
increase in subnational expenditure or revenue shares—the conventional measures 
of decentralization—will increase GDP per capita growth by approximately 0.4 
percentage points; however, the results differ for developed versus developing 
countries. 
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The last three decades have witnessed an unprecedented increase in decentralization 
reforms, not only in developed countries, some of which had been historically decentralized, but 
also in developing and transitional countries, the latter especially moving away from the 
perceived failings of centralized socialist planning (Drucker, 1993; World Bank, 1996).1 In fact, 
according to data gathered by Garman et al. (2001), more than 80 percent of the 75 developing 
countries analyzed were undergoing some decentralization of authority by the beginning of the 
millennium. In the case of developed countries, the index of regional authority computed by 
Hooghe et al. (2010) for 42 democracies and semi-democracies reveals that 70 percent of the 
countries have decentralized since 1950.  
There are several reasons for this trend. For most countries, fiscal decentralization has 
been a means for increasing the efficiency of government service delivery to achieve higher 
economic growth, while other nations have embraced decentralization following discontent with 
failed central planning practices, especially the former Soviet countries. In other cases, 
decentralization has been used to appease the eruption of conflict and to maintain territorial unity 
(Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2016). As initially argued by Oates (1974), fiscally decentralized 
systems can be more efficient at providing public services at a local level, resulting in better 
social conditions and higher economic growth. A vast empirical literature has followed over the 
last decades with the goal of determining the actual effects of decentralization on economic 
growth. A quick scholarly search reveals over 60 published works on the impact of fiscal 
                                                          
1 Even many contemporary communist regimes, such as China or Vietnam, have moved significantly toward fiscally 




decentralization on various economic indicators, with more than half of those focusing on 
economic growth (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2016, Baskaran and Feld, 2013).  
However, virtually all the previous papers in this vast literature suffer from a fundamental 
identification problem: economic growth is impacted by decentralization, but decentralization 
can also be affected by economic growth (Jilek, 2018). This presence of endogeneity continues 
to call into question the received wisdom regarding the causal effect of fiscal decentralization on 
growth that has been embraced by decentralized governance in recent decades.2  
In this paper, we offer a solution to this identification problem. We use as instrumental 
variables the Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI), a measure of a country’s elevation 
heterogeneity, and country size. These variables are jointly highly correlated with fiscal 
decentralization and neither directly nor indirectly correlated with economic growth, except 
through fiscal decentralization. The basic idea behind this relationship is that geographic 
conditions, such as significant variations in elevation or country size, have long influenced the 
degree of heterogeneity in tastes and preferences for local and regional public goods and services 
in countries around the world. This persistence of heterogeneity in demand for public services 
eventually leads to heightened demand for fiscal autonomy and fiscal decentralization. Even 
though the effect of geography can be weakened by migration and infrastructure development, 
the overall effect would appear to endure over time due to the assimilation of newcomers. A 
more detailed discussion follows in the next sections. 
                                                          
2 The focus of this paper is on decentralization and economic growth. However, there is also a large literature on the impact of 
decentralization on other variables of interest, such as macroeconomic stability, income distribution or corruption. In most cases, 




Empirically, we find that both of the geographical instrumental variables perform as 
strong valid instruments for fiscal decentralization and that fiscal decentralization has a 
significant positive impact on economic growth, especially in the case of developed countries. 
Our findings show that a 10-percent increase in the share of subnational expenditure in total 
general government expenditures will increase GDP per capita growth by 0.42 percentage points, 
while a 10-percent increase in the share of subnational revenue in total general government 
revenue will increase the GDP per capita growth by 0.41 percentage points. Overall, these 
findings support the side of the literature that has found a positive impact of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth (Yilmaz, 1999; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Thiessen, 2003; 
Breuss and Eller, 2004; Iimi, 2005). However, our estimated coefficients are significantly 
smaller than the average coefficient of 0.6 reported in past studies that found a positive impact 
(Iimi, 2005), or the coefficients above 1 usually reported in single country studies. In our 
empirical analysis, we further partition the sample into developed and developing countries. For 
the subsample of developed countries, we find statistically significant coefficients for 
expenditure and revenue decentralization of 0.25 and 0.52, respectively, which are larger than 
the average magnitude of 0.12-0.15 reported in past studies for this group of countries (Thiessen, 
2003). However, for developing countries, the coefficients are not significant at the 10-percent 
confidence level, a finding that supports another strand of literature related to this other group of 
countries (Woller and Phillips, 1998). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the 
relevant literature, Section 3 examines the validity of geography as an instrument, Section 4 
describes the data and the empirical strategy, Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 




2. Literature review 
There is an extensive body of literature spanning decades of both a theoretical and 
empirical nature on the impact of fiscal decentralization on growth and other economic 
indicators. Although not speaking directly to the issue of growth, the traditional “first-
generation” literature pioneered by Oates (1972) that emphasized associated efficiency gains, 
and even Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) argument of decentralization containing an inefficient 
Leviathan, hint at the potential growth-enhancing role of fiscal decentralization. On the other 
hand, the “second-generation” theory of fiscal decentralization developed by Qian and Weingast 
(1997) and others, which emphasizes the role of government officials as self-interested agent, 
hints at the possibility that the outcomes of decentralization may not always be growth 
enhancing.  
The literature that has directly focused on the relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and economic growth has been mostly empirical, and the findings have varied significantly in 
direction and size. The large share of this research has been based on cross-country studies, 
especially developed countries due to the higher quality of available data,3 but there has also 
been a significant number of country case studies, especially across provinces in China.4 Early 
on, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) concluded that there was no empirical consensus on 
the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, and that conclusion was still reaffirmed 
more recently by Baskaran et al. (2017). Although there are several potential reasons for this lack 
of consensus on the empirical findings, one serious untreated problem that is common to most of 
                                                          
3 See Oates (1995), Yilmaz (1999), Gemmel, Kneller, and Sanz (2013), Davoodi and Zou (1998), Woller and Phillips (1998), 
Ezcurra and Rodriguez-Pose (2011), Baskaran and Feld (2013), Blöchliger and Akgun (2018), and Wang (2018). 
4 See Qiao et al. (2008), Feld et al. (2004), Akai and Sakata (2002), Zhang and Zou (1998, 2001), Xie et al. (1999), Lin and Liu 




this past literature has been the presence of endogeneity between fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2016).   
However, this endogeneity problem has not always gone unnoticed. Some studies have 
used initial values of the independent variables to address endogeneity (Akai and Sakata, 2002; 
Bodman et al., 2009), while other studies have used lagged independent variables as IVs (Iimi, 
2005; Enikopolov and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Gemmel, Kneller and Sanz, 2013). While a plausible 
solution, this being a complex policy reform issue, fiscal decentralization institutions tend to be 
quite stable over time and therefore susceptible to auto-correlation, which means that initial or 
lagged values are likely to be just as endogenous with regard to economic growth.  
Other studies have used a variety of IVs to address the issue of endogeneity. For 
example, Perez-Sebastian and Raveh (2013) use lagged democracy as an instrument, and La 
Porta et al. (1999) use the country’s legal origin. Although those instruments are appealing, both 
of these variables are highly correlated with economic growth itself, even when using their 
lagged values, and therefore cannot truly satisfy the exclusion restriction. Closer to the approach 
suggested in this paper, Enikopolov and Zhuravskaya (2007) use land area as an IV as part of a 
robustness test. However, they only report their first stage results where land area and its 
interactions with other explanatory variables usually take insignificant coefficients. Most 
recently, Ligthart and Oudheusden (2017) used a composite of several country characteristics, 
including legal system origin, country size, federal system and geographical position, as an IV. 
The authors employ an instrumental variable in the Bartik spirit, which, for a country, is a 
weighted average of the fiscal decentralization measures of all the other countries in the sample, 
where the weights are determined by the similarity of these countries to that particular country. 




similar degree and process of fiscal decentralization. While this IV sounds promising, the authors 
admit that they interpolate missing fiscal decentralization values and use these characteristics as 
a weight, rather than as IVs themselves.  
A fair conclusion to be drawn from this literature is that the causal effect of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth remains an open question. Beyond the many cases of 
contradictory findings, practically all of the previous empirical work on the question suffers from 
the potential endogeneity problem due to reverse causality and omitted variable bias.  
The main objective and contribution of this paper is to address the issue of endogeneity 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth using various dimensions of geography as 
instrumental variables for fiscal decentralization. The validity of geography as an IV for fiscal 
decentralization is carefully scrutinized but ultimately supported by our analysis. As we describe 
in the next section, unlike previous attempts using an IV approach, our geography-based IVs are 
exogenous and satisfy the exclusion restriction, including over time. Our estimated results using 
this IV approach show to what extent the findings in the previous literature concerning fiscal 
decentralization and growth need to be reassessed. These findings are valuable because beyond 
the issue of economic growth, there are several other significant bodies of literature that examine 
the impact of fiscal decentralization on other important economic dimensions, such as 
macroeconomic stability or the extent of corruption, which potentially suffer from the same 
endogeneity issue vis-à-vis fiscal decentralization. The instrumental variables developed in this 
paper can potentially also be applied to those cases. In the next section, we address the 




3. The role of geography 
The relationship between geography and decentralization has theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings. On the theoretical side, Panizza (1999) develops a model of an existing trade-off 
between the central government’s share in the public sector and its total size. He suggests that 
the equilibrium level of decentralization should be positively correlated with the heterogeneity of 
tastes for public goods among residents, with the level of democracy, and with country size. A 
second model by Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) is based on balancing the costs of subnational 
administration with the “spatial decay” of goods that are provided from the center. Among other 
factors, they predict higher decentralization the larger is the spatial decay of local public services 
provided to the hinterland by the central government. Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016) build on 
these two approaches by hypothesizing that geographic heterogeneity and ethnic fractionalization 
are determinants of “spatial decay” and that their presence will lead to higher levels of fiscal 
decentralization. Empirically, these authors find significant effects of the Geographic 
Fragmentation Index (GFI) and country size on fiscal decentralization. Acknowledging the time-
invariance of geography-based variables for estimation approaches involving differencing, 
Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016) interact geography with infrastructure, with the rationale that 
the effects of geography should diminish over time with the development of infrastructure. With 
this interaction term, the impact of geography on decentralization decreases, but it still remains 
important and statistically significant. For example, Panizza (1999) finds a strong positive effect 
of country size and ethnic fractionalization on fiscal decentralization. These same results are 
found to be robust using different control variables by Treisman (2006) and Martinez-Vazquez 




expenditure in Europe is increasing in land area and population size, as well as ethnic, language 
and regional fractionalization.  
On the other hand, the effect of geography on economic growth has been the subject of a 
fierce debate in the literature between the proponents of the “geography hypothesis” (Sachs and 
Warner, 1997 and others) and the proponents of the “institutions hypotheses” (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2001 and others). The proponents of the geography hypothesis argue that 
geography matters for growth because of many factors, including distance to major ports along 
rivers or seas/oceans, land-lockedness, the prevalence of environmental diseases in the latter type 
of countries, or the availability of large natural resource endowments. In contrast, the 
“institutions hypothesis” proponents argue that the key factor in economic growth is the 
institutional framework that countries adopt and that geography only plays an indirect role 
through institutions, so that after accounting for institutions, the effect of geography on economic 
growth should vanish.5 
Interestingly, the dimensions of geography of interest to this paper (elevation and country 
size) that we use as instrumental variables are the least frequent variables used to explain the 
potential role of geography in the economic growth literature.6 The view we take is that even 
though there is a potential direct effect of geography on economic growth, this relationship is 
questionable on several grounds. First, geography may affect the diversity or composition of 
economic activity as opposed to the level of economic activity itself. People living in 
mountainous areas may not be able to grow certain crops, but they do participate in other 
                                                          
5 See Przeworksi (2004) and Lorenz et al. (2005) for more discussion on the debate.  
6 For example, Nunn and Puga (2009) use terrain ruggedness to explain economic growth problems in Africa, while Sachs et al. 
(2002) use distance to ports and the average slope of the land to explain economic growth in China’s provinces; however, the 




economic activities that are not available to lowlanders. The world offers sufficient examples of 
countries with no geographic advantages that have emerged as economic powers arguably as a 
consequence of other factors, such as strong institutions or high-quality human capital, as in the 
case of Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, etc. Second, geography being exogenous (i.e., 
economic growth does not affect geography) can affect economic growth through other channels, 
such as trade, institutions, or infrastructure. However, these channels can be controlled more or 
less successfully since none of them are fully unobserved. To summarize, if these considerations 
are valid, using geography as an instrument for fiscal decentralization in explaining growth is a 
valid strategy. 
4. Data and empirical framework 
We construct a comprehensive panel (time-series cross-country) dataset for over 70 
countries for the period of 1981-2010, although the sample varies depending on the specification 
and variables used due to differing data availability. Most of the variables were extracted from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), while the fiscal decentralization 
variables are from IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), complemented by the use of 
OECD databases. The variable descriptions and sources are listed in the Appendix (Table A1). 
We average the values for five-year periods to smooth the data over the macroeconomic cycle 
and also to allow us to focus on the long-run effects. The summary statistics of the main 
variables are also reported in the Appendix (Table A2).  
To measure decentralization, we use two conventional and frequently utilized measures: 
(1) the ratio of total subnational revenues to general government revenues, and (2) the ratio of 
total subnational expenditure to general government expenditures. The potential flaws associated 




but as noted by Letelier (2005), there is no evidence of a systematic measurement error across 
countries in the GFS data. Therefore, regression results should not be affected if the sample is 
large enough, which it is in our case.   
The reason for using these two measures of decentralization is that they capture different 
dimensions of fiscal decentralization and their impact is therefore potentially different. 
Frequently, asymmetric expenditure decentralization is associated with stronger central 
administrations and therefore may not always imply effective decentralization (Martinez-
Vazquez and Timofeev, 2010). On the other hand, revenue decentralization is usually harder to 
achieve politically, but it may report higher accountability and more efficient expenditures. 
While both measures of decentralization often go hand in hand, using both measures in one 
equation is likely to lead to multicollinearity issues.  
4.1 Measuring geography 
We measure geography on two dimensions, using the Geographic Fragmentation Index 
(GFI) previously developed by Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016) and country size.7 The data for 
the GFI are acquired from NASA’s Earth Observing System Data and Information System 
(EOSDIS) hosted by The Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) 
at Columbia University. The data are available for years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2010. Since there 
is low variation in the GFI over time, to address the missing values for 1981-1985, we assume 
them to be the same as for 1986-1990, while data for 2001-2005 are assumed to be the same as 
for 2006-2010. 
                                                          
7Given that the GFI and country size are actually correlated, instead of using country size per se, we use the residuals of the 




The GFI reflects the weighted probability that two individuals taken at random in the 
country do not live in similar altitude zones, with the weight matrix calculated as the average 
distance between altitudes. Thus, the index is simply calculated as:  












 is the share of the population by elevation and wij measures the distance between 
altitude i and altitude j. This measure goes from zero, which corresponds to a case where all the 
population is settled in the same altitude zone, to one which corresponds to the implausible case 
where each lives in a different altitude. In general, geographical fragmentation will increase with 
the number of altitude-zones and equal weight for each group.8 Figure 1 shows the geographical 
fragmentation index in 1990 ranked from countries that are less fragmented (i.e., Belarus, 
Paraguay) to countries that show high levels of geographical fragmentation (i.e., Colombia, 
China, or Switzerland).  
                                                          
8 The methodology applied for the index is similar to the one applied by Lora et. al. (2003) for geographical zones and that applied 




Figure 1 Global Map of Geographical Fragmentation Index (Own Calculation for 1990)9 
 
 
For estimating the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, we follow the 
conventional neoclassical economic growth specification (Barro, 1990; Mankiw et al., 1992; 
Davoodi and Zou, 1998). Specifically, we control for the log of initial GDP per capita to account 
for convergence and also control for population growth, human capital,10 openness to 
international trade, democratic governance, quality of institutions,11 and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization. We also add regional and time dummies. 
The estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth is done in two stages: 
First stage:                                        FDit = α0 + γXit + δZit + εit        (2) 
                                                          
9 The Geographic Fragmentation Index in the figure varies from 0 to 100 (probability * 100), with 100 being most fragmented 
geographic elevation (all individuals living in different altitude), while 0 is for least fragmentation of elevation (all individuals 
living in the same altitude). Darker color indicates higher fragmentation.  
10 Human capital is proxied by infant mortality. Although less than perfect, this variable allows for the most complete panel 
dataset for the timespan that we use. 




Second stage:                                   GDPpcgrit = ρ0 + θXit + σFD̂it
̇ + uit   (3) 
where FDit is the measure of fiscal decentralization, while FD̂it is the predicted values from the 
first stage equation; GDPpcgrit is the growth in GDP per capita, our measure of economic 
growth; Xit is the set of control variables listed above; and Zit is the set of country-specific 
geography instrumental variables, namely, the GFI and country size.  
Our primary interest is in the coefficient σ, which represents the exogenous causal effect 
of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. This coefficient can be interpreted as the 
percentage point change in GDP per capita growth associated with a one percentage point change 
in the share of subnational governments in either the total government revenue or expenditure. 
To address the endogeneity of fiscal decentralization, we use the geography IVs that are 
exogenous to economic growth and other factors and which we claim, based on economic logic 
and statistical tests, do not directly affect economic growth after controlling for the role of 
institutions. The low time variance of geography presents a problem when using panel estimation 
methods like fixed effects or GMM that imply differencing of the data over time. For this reason, 
we use the conventional pooled OLS with region- and time-specific dummy variables; random 
effects estimation results are provided as a robustness check. 
5. Results 
5.1 Simple and IV OLS results 
As reported in the first two columns of Table 1, we find a positive and significant impact 
of fiscal decentralization on economic growth for both measures of fiscal decentralization for the 




expenditures is expected to increase GDP per capita growth by 0.2 percentage points; or a ten-
percentage point increase in the share of subnational government revenues is expected to 
increase GDP per capita growth by 0.31 percentage points. Overall, these findings support the 
side of the literature that previously found a positive impact of fiscal decentralization on 
economic growth (Yilmaz, 1999; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Thiessen, 2003; Breuss and Eller, 
2004; Iimi, 2005). More specifically, our results are relatively close to previous comparable 
findings of 0.15 for developed countries in expenditure decentralization (Thiessen, 2003), but are 
considerably lower than the 0.6 percentage points reported by Iimi (2005) for a sample of both 
developed and developing countries. For the other control variables, the negative significant 
coefficient for infant mortality and the positive and significant one for trade openness replicate 
previous findings in the literature.  
Table 1. Estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth 









Decentralization      
















Log of initial GDP per capita -2.045*** -2.171*** -2.379*** -2.293*** 
(0.455) (0.403) (0.478) (0.404) 
Population growth (WDI) -61.358** -63.259** -58.663** -60.958** 
(23.667) (25.359) (24.577) (24.842) 
Infant mortality (WDI) -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.031*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Trade openness (PWT) 0.008** 0.009** 0.010*** 0.010** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Political rights (FH) -0.095 -0.049 -0.072 -0.052 
(0.101) (0.093) (0.098) (0.088) 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (AL) 0.174 -0.596 0.069 -0.753 
(0.632) (0.594) (0.662) (0.648) 
Constant 20.681*** 21.994*** 23.181*** 22.924*** 
(4.357) (3.960) (4.386) (3.855) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 285 301 285 301 
R-squared 0.315 0.391 0.301 0.388 





The results from using the IVs approach are reported in the last two columns of Table 1. 
The full tables including the first-stage regressions are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
Again, we find a highly significant and positive impact of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth for both measures of decentralization, and both coefficients are larger than the OLS 
estimates. In this case, a ten percentage point increase in the share of subnational government 
expenditures is expected to increase GDP per capita growth by 0.42 percentage points, while a 
ten percentage point increase in the share of subnational government revenues is expected to 
increase GDP per capita growth by 0.41 percentage points. Nevertheless, the estimated size of 
the impact after correcting for endogeneity is smaller than the average coefficient of 0.6 reported 
in previous studies that found a positive impact on both developed and developing countries 
(Iimi, 2005) and is also smaller than the coefficients found within-country, which usually report 
the estimated coefficients above.  
Again, we observe mostly expected results for the other control variables. We find 
population growth to be highly significant and negative as most of the previous literature reports, 
while infant mortality is also highly significant and negative as expected. We also find a positive 
and significant impact of trade openness on economic growth. The rest of the control variables 
are insignificant. 
Regarding the first-stage results (see Table A3 in the Appendix), consistent with 
Canavire-Bacarreza, et al. (2016), we find that in both expenditure and revenue decentralization 
cases, the instruments are positive and highly significant, as expected. Moreover, since we use 
country clustered standard errors, we refer to the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic, which is 




Based on Stock and Yogo’s rule of thumb, both are higher than the critical F test value at the 5 
percent significance level, so we can reject the claim that the instruments are weak in both the 
expenditure and revenue regressions cases (Stock and Yogo, 2005).  
5.2 Heterogeneous impact of fiscal decentralization. 
Less-developed countries tend to have lower levels of fiscal decentralization than 
developed countries. Carniti et al. (2018) find a bell-shaped relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and growth based on a theoretical model that they developed for European 
countries. When we look at the groups of countries that are members of the OECD, we observe a 
similar pattern in the last decade, with the average share of subnational government in total 
government revenue and expenditure being higher compared to that of non-OECD countries 
(Table 2). In the case of revenue decentralization, the average share of the subnational 
government in OECD countries is 21.5 percent versus 17.6 percent in non-OECD countries. The 
difference is even larger in the case of expenditure decentralization, with an average share of 
subnational government in the expenditure of 29.2 percent for the OECD group versus 17.5 
percent for the non-OECD group. 
Table 2. Summary statistics of fiscal decentralization measures, 2000-2012 
 Revenue Decentralization Expenditure Decentralization 
 OECD Non-OECD OECD Non-OECD 
Mean 21.50% 17.60% 29.20% 17.50% 
Standard Deviation 14.00% 14.90% 14.40% 14.40% 
Minimum 1.20% 0.13% 3.90% 0.30% 
Maximum 63.50% 84.10% 65.40% 81.80% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Revenue decentralization is measured as the share of sub-national revenue in total revenue; expenditure 
decentralization is measured as the share of sub-national expenditure in total expenditure.  
 
These differences are relevant because the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic 




decentralization, there may be other differences that may affect that basic relationship, such as 
governance institutions or the quality and skills of public employees. Since it is practically 
impossible to control for these features, we divide the sample into two groups of countries: 
developed versus developing (OECD vs non-OECD). Ideally, we would like to conduct a 
quintile effect analysis; however, the sample size is too low for each quintile to reach any 
reliable conclusions.  
Table 3 presents the IV OLS estimation of economic growth equation for OECD and 
non-OECD countries (full tables including first-stage regressions are presented in Tables A4 and 
A5 of the Appendix). For the OECD sample, we find that the impact of both expenditure and 
revenue decentralization is still positive and significant. However, the magnitude of the impact 
changes for both types of fiscal decentralization measures. In the case of expenditure 
decentralization, we find that a ten-percentage-point increase in the share of subnational 
government expenditure in total government expenditure is expected to increase the GDP per 
capita growth by 0.25 percentage points, which is 40 percent lower than the magnitude found in 
the full sample of countries. In contrast, the impact of revenue decentralization is larger, and we 
find that a ten-percentage-point increase in the share of subnational government revenue in total 
government revenue is expected to increase the GDP per capita growth by 0.52 percentage 





Table 3. IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by country samples 










Expenditure decentralization 0.025**  0.050  
(0.010)  (0.032)  
Revenue decentralization 
 0.052**  0.047 
 (0.023)  (0.032) 
Log of initial GDP per capita -2.173*** -3.435*** -1.596** -1.468** 
(0.384) (0.559) (0.636) (0.600) 
Population growth (WDI) -2.701 4.221 -39.579 -41.115 
(28.353) (25.579) (31.846) (34.272) 
Infant mortality (WDI) -0.013 -0.096 -0.025*** -0.021** 
(0.117) (0.087) (0.010) (0.009) 
Trade openness (PWT) 0.007** 0.011*** 0.013 0.010 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) 
Political rights (FH) -0.503 -0.291 -0.222* -0.163 
(0.355) (0.273) (0.134) (0.112) 
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (AL) 
-1.283*** -2.255** 0.971 0.177 
(0.472) (1.060) (1.347) (1.410) 
Constant 22.434*** 34.928*** 15.570*** 14.786*** 
(4.476) (5.238) (5.668) (5.516) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 138 147 147 154 
R-squared 0.496 0.482 0.411 0.494 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
As for the non-OECD countries sample, we find that the impact of both expenditure and 
revenue decentralization is insignificant at the 10 percent confidence level; however, both are 
positive and significant at a weaker 14 percent confidence level. In terms of impact, a ten-
percentage-point increase in the share of subnational government expenditures would be 
expected to increase the GDP per capita growth by 0.5 percentage points, while a ten-percentage-
point increase in the share of subnational government revenue in total government revenues 
would be expected to increase the GDP per capita growth by 0.47 percentage points. The impact 
of expenditure decentralization is larger than in developed countries, while the impact of revenue 




support to a different strand of the previous literature that does not find a significant impact of 
fiscal decentralization on economic growth (Woller and Phillips, 1998). 
As for the first stage of IV estimations (reported in Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix), 
country size is still highly significant and positive, while the GFI loses significance at the 10 
percent confidence level for the OECD sample. However, the joint significance of the 
instruments still holds. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is at 11.6 for expenditure 
decentralization and is acceptable within a 15 percent confidence level, according to the Stock-
Yogo classification. However, the F statistic falls to 3.3 in the case of revenue decentralization, 
although the Cragg-Donald F statistic is above 11.6. For the non-OECD sample, we observe that 
both the GFI and country size are highly significant and positive, as in the case of the full 
sample, and the Wald F-statistic is 23 and 35 for expenditure and revenue IV estimations, 
respectively, which are way above the 10 percent confidence level, thus providing strong 
evidence for non-weak IVs. We may speculate that the impact of the GFI may be lower for 
developed countries since they have better infrastructure, which may undermine the impact of 
geographical features within a country. 
What might explain the difference in impact between developing and developed 
countries? While this question goes beyond the scope of this paper, one hypothesis that has been 
advanced in previous literature is the potential nonlinear relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth (Thiessen, 2003; Carniti et al., 2018). Drawing on this 
literature, it is expected that more developed countries (OECD) may present higher levels of 
fiscal decentralization and a stronger impact on economic growth, while low income countries 
may show weaker effects on economic growth. A potential argument for this lies in the fiscal 




institutions, a less strict rule of law, and worse economic and social conditions that restrain the 
effects of fiscal decentralization compared to those of OECD countries. Moreover, fiscal 
decentralization design may also help explain the differential effects of our decentralization 
measures. Non-OECD country results are higher for our expenditure measure than for our 
revenue measure. This may be due to the limited tax autonomy that subnational governments 
have in low income countries compared to that of the expenditures. In contrast, OECD countries 
present higher levels of tax autonomy, which in turn translates into higher effects of revenue 
decentralization on growth compared to that of non-OECD countries and even to their own 
expenditure decentralization.  
5.3 Robustness checks 
We provide several robustness checks of the main results presented above. First, while 
we cannot perform fixed-effect estimations, to exploit the panel data at hand, we estimate a 
random effects model. As can be seen in Table A6 in the Appendix, the results for the random 
effect estimation show approximately the same coefficients for the impact of fiscal 
decentralization as the simple OLS regression. The same can be said for the estimated 
coefficients using IV random effect estimation and IV OLS results (Table A7). Second, to 
partially address the potential nonlinear nature of the relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and economic growth raised in the previous section, we introduce a log form version for GDP 
per capita growth, which is consistent with the potential inverse U-shape hypothesized in the 
previous literature. We again find that the GFI and land size are non-weak and valid instruments 
in the first stage and that fiscal decentralization has a significant impact on economic growth for 





Third, we further explore the joint impact of fiscal decentralization variables. Although 
expenditure and revenue decentralization frequently go hand in hand, they address and measure 
fundamentally different aspects of fiscal decentralization and capture different mechanisms of 
the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 
2010). The results partially confirm that when we include the other fiscal decentralization 
measure in the first and second stages, we find that the other fiscal decentralization measure is 
highly significant in the first stage, while in the second stage, none of the fiscal decentralization 
measures are significant (Table A9). This result suggests that overall, fiscal decentralization 
efforts go hand in hand, and when a country decides to decentralize, it decentralizes both 
expenditure and revenue components of the budget. At the same time, due to a high correlation, 
the second stage results suffer from multicollinearity and do not yield any meaningful results. In 
other words, while they are highly correlated, it makes sense to study them separately to identify 
the separate mechanism through which fiscal decentralization affects economic growth. 
Fourth, we test the sensitivity of the results to a different period of averaging in order to 
account for possible business cycles that are longer than five years; specifically, we perform ten-
year averaging of all variables. This obviously decreases the sample size, but it is encouraging to 
see that the main results still stand. We find again that the GFI and land size are valid and strong 
instruments in the first stage, and that fiscal decentralization measures have a significant impact 
on economic growth for all samples of countries (Table A10). In fact, compared to our base main 
results, the magnitudes of the impact are larger by approximately 15-20 percent. Finally, we look 
at the validity and strength of the instrument separately. We argue that both the GFI and land size 
jointly determine fiscal decentralization in the first stage and that they should be used jointly as 




stage (Table A11), and land area is usually significant in the first stage (Table A12). However, 
none of the fiscal decentralization measures are significant in the second stage when they are 
based on either separate instrumental variable. This strongly suggests that as hypothesized, the 
GFI captures an important dimension through which the causal impact of fiscal decentralization 
on economic growth is identified.  
6. Conclusion 
The question of the causal impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth has been 
one of the most researched issues in the literature on fiscal federalism. However, a general 
glance at this vast empirical literature reveals that practically all of the previous papers are 
flawed because they suffer from a fundamental identification problem. This problem arises from 
the presence of “reverse causality” or “simultaneity,” where fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth simultaneously affect (cause) each other. Any estimation of the causal impact of fiscal 
decentralization without accounting for these identification issues is flawed and cannot be 
considered truly reliable.  
In this paper, we reason that the Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI) and country are 
valid instruments because they are highly correlated with fiscal decentralization and neither is 
directly or indirectly correlated with economic growth, except through fiscal decentralization.12 
The basic idea is that geographic conditions, such as significant variations in elevation and 
country size, have exerted a large influence on the degree of heterogeneity in tastes and 
preferences for local and regional public goods and services in countries around the world. The 
                                                          
12 Again, even though certain specific dimensions of geography other than elevation heterogeneity can play a direct role in 
economic growth, we argue that by controlling for the role of institutions, the role of geography can be neutralized or eliminated, 




persistence of heterogeneity in demand for public services eventually leads to a heightened 
demand for fiscal autonomy and fiscal decentralization. Even though the effect of geography can 
be weakened by migration, the overall effect is likely to endure, due to the assimilation of 
newcomers. 
 In the empirical analysis, we find that both geography measures are strong and valid as 
instruments for fiscal decentralization in the first stage of the 2SLS approach. Moreover, we find 
that fiscal decentralization measured as a share of expenditure or revenue of subnational 
government in total general government expenditure or revenue has a significant positive impact 
on economic growth, especially in the case of developed countries. Overall, these findings 
support the side of the previous literature that finds a positive impact of fiscal decentralization on 
economic growth. However, when we separate our observations into two subsamples of 
developing and developed countries, the strong statistically significant results only hold for the 
group of developed countries. These results hold some important policy implications, especially 
because the rationale for decentralization reforms in the developing world has often been based 
on the beneficial impact that these reforms will have on economic growth. However, the impact 
is not a negative one, and fiscal decentralization reform can offer many other positive outcomes 
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Table A1. Description and sources of variables used in regressions 
Variable Description Source 
Expenditure 
decentralization 





Share of subnational revenue in total government 
revenue 
IMF GFS 








GDP per capita 
growth 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices 
based on constant local currency 
WDI 
Political Rights 
Index of political rights freedom, graded between 1 




Index of ethnic fractionalization, a higher value indicates 
higher fractionalization and more diversity of ethnicities. 
Alesina et al. (2003) 
GDP per capita 
GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) 
in constant international dollars. 
WDI 
Infant mortality 
A number of infants dying before reaching one year of 
age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. 
WDI 
Openness 
Exports plus Imports divided by real GDP per capita in 
current prices. 






Table A2. Summary statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
GDP per capita growth (WDI) 285 1.9 2.3 -5.3 11.0 
OECD 138 1.9 1.6 -2.1 8.3 
Non-OECD 147 1.9 2.8 -5.3 11.0 
Expenditure Decentralization 285 24.0 16.4 0.6 65.4 
OECD 138 30.9 15.2 4.0 65.4 
Non-OECD 147 17.5 14.8 0.6 54.9 
Revenue Decentralization 280 19.4 14.8 0.8 57.4 
OECD 138 21.6 14.6 1.2 57.4 
Non-OECD 142 17.3 14.8 0.8 54.5 
Geographic Fragmentation Index 
(GFI) 285 35.5 7.1 3.7 47.5 
OECD 138 33.4 6.5 15.3 45.4 
Non-OECD 147 37.4 7.2 3.7 47.5 
Country size 285  1,313,267    2,466,812         1,993    9,458,669  
OECD 138       1,344,788         2,906,174             21,339         9,458,669  
Non-OECD 147       1,283,676         1,977,335               1,993         9,197,975  
Population growth (WDI) 285 1.23% 0.97% -1.07% 4.06% 
OECD 138 0.67% 0.61% -0.52% 3.55% 
Non-OECD 147 1.77% 0.95% -1.07% 4.06% 
Infant mortality (WDI) 285 33.9 40.5 3.2 213.3 
OECD 138 8.5 4.1 3.2 26.5 
Non-OECD 147 57.8 44.5 9.3 213.3 
Trade openness (PWT) 285 69.8 37.1 13.1 203.9 
OECD 138 70.9 31.6 18.2 161.2 
Non-OECD 147 68.7 41.7 13.1 203.9 
Political Rights (FH) 285 2.3 1.7 1 7 
OECD 138 1.2 0.7 1.0 6.0 
Non-OECD 147 3.3 1.7 1.0 7.0 
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization 
(AL) 285 36.4% 24.7% 0.2% 93.0% 
OECD 138 21.9% 19.2% 0.2% 71.2% 






Table A3. IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Expenditure Decentralization Revenue Decentralization 
VARIABLES First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage 
          
Expenditure decentralization  0.042**   
 (0.021)   
Revenue decentralization    0.041** 
   (0.020) 
Geographic fragmentation 
index (GFI) 
1.244***  1.257**  
(0.459)  (0.570)  
Log country size 4.535***  4.582***  
(1.017)  (1.181)  
Log of initial GDP per capita 11.600*** -2.379*** 8.221** -2.293*** 
(3.130) (0.478) (3.268) (0.404) 
Population growth (WDI) -282.506 -58.663** -330.104** -60.958** 
(182.779) (24.577) (164.692) (24.842) 
Infant mortality (WDI) 0.119** -0.034*** 0.027 -0.031*** 
(0.054) (0.008) (0.061) (0.007) 
Trade openness (PWT) -0.010 0.010*** -0.045 0.010** 
(0.046) (0.004) (0.053) (0.004) 
Political rights (FH) -1.457 -0.072 -0.560 -0.052 
(0.924) (0.098) (1.084) (0.088) 
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (AL) 
1.903 0.069 10.564 -0.753 
(8.326) (0.662) (11.130) (0.648) 
Constant -123.066*** 23.181*** -97.009*** 22.924*** 
(30.199) (4.386) (28.053) (3.855) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 285 285 301 301 
R-squared  0.301  0.388 





Table A4. IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth - OECD sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Expenditure Decentralization Revenue Decentralization 
VARIABLES First Stage Second Stage First Stage 
Second 
Stage 
Expenditure decentralization  0.025**   
 (0.010)   
Revenue decentralization    0.052** 
   (0.023) 
Geographic fragmentation 
index (GFI) 
1.043  0.840  
(0.704)  (0.661)  
Log country size 5.295***  3.402**  
(1.418)  (1.375)  
Log of initial GDP per capita 16.606** -2.173*** 21.533*** -3.435*** 
(7.272) (0.384) (5.788) (0.559) 
Population growth (WDI) 287.563 -2.701 222.125 4.221 
(371.902) (28.353) (337.846) (25.579) 
Infant mortality (WDI) -1.660*** -0.013 -1.242* -0.096 
(0.464) (0.117) (0.701) (0.087) 
Trade openness (PWT) 0.062 0.007** -0.019 0.011*** 
(0.069) (0.003) (0.076) (0.004) 
Political rights (FH) 3.278*** -0.503 2.073 -0.291 
(1.040) (0.355) (1.464) (0.273) 
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (AL) 
22.620** -1.283*** 34.951*** -2.255** 
(9.204) (0.472) (13.037) (1.060) 
Constant -181.222** 20.785*** -223.710*** 32.428*** 
(76.712) (3.895) (63.669) (5.156) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 138 138 147 147 
R-squared   0.496   0.482 






Table A5. IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth - Non-OECD sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Expenditure Decentralization Revenue Decentralization 
VARIABLES First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage 
          
Expenditure decentralization  0.050   
 (0.032)   
Revenue decentralization    0.047 
   (0.032) 
Geographic fragmentation index 
(GFI) 
2.525***  2.279***  
(0.318)  (0.406)  
Log country size 5.951***  5.768***  
(0.723)  (0.844)  
Log of initial GDP per capita 2.897 -1.596** 3.089 -1.468** 
(2.962) (0.636) (2.879) (0.600) 
Population growth (WDI) -517.102*** -39.579 -392.527** -41.115 
(189.225) (31.846) (192.488) (34.272) 
Infant mortality (WDI) 0.099** -0.025*** 0.056 -0.021** 
(0.043) (0.010) (0.048) (0.009) 
Trade openness (PWT) 0.007 0.013 -0.021 0.010 
(0.035) (0.009) (0.041) (0.010) 
Political rights (FH) -1.298** -0.222* -0.496 -0.163 
(0.639) (0.134) (0.837) (0.112) 
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (AL) 
-16.911** 0.971 -15.368* 0.177 
(7.601) (1.347) (8.807) (1.410) 
Constant -96.172*** 17.487*** -88.775*** 16.862*** 
(24.283) (4.941) (21.905) (4.689) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 147 147 154 154 
R-squared   0.411   0.494 






Table A6. Simple random effect estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth 






      
Expenditure Decentralization 0.023*  
(0.013)  
Revenue Decentralization  0.032*** 
 (0.012) 
Log of Initial GDP per capita -2.226*** -2.241*** 
(0.472) (0.405) 
Population growth (WDI) -61.149** -60.616** 
(24.387) (25.102) 
Infant mortality (WDI) -0.034*** -0.032*** 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Trade openness (PWT) 0.008** 0.009** 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Political Rights (FH) -0.121 -0.079 
(0.105) (0.093) 
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization (AL) 0.504 -0.373 
(0.673) (0.632) 
Constant 22.372*** 22.661*** 
(4.498) (3.967) 
Regional dummies YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES 
Observations 285 301 
Number of countries 68 68 






Table A7. IV Random effect estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Expenditure Decentralization Revenue Decentralization 
VARIABLES First Stage 
Second 
Stage First Stage 
Second 
Stage      
Expenditure decentralization  0.042*   
 (0.022)   
Revenue decentralization    0.041** 
   (0.021) 
Geographic fragmentation index 
(GFI) 
1.244***  1.257**  
(0.458)  (0.569)  
Log country size 4.535***  4.582***  
(1.017)  (1.180)  
Log of initial GDP per capita 11.600*** -2.379*** 8.221** -2.293*** 
(3.130) (0.497) (3.267) (0.420) 
Population growth (WDI) -282.506 -58.663** -330.104 -60.958** 
(182.779) (25.583) (164.69) (25.813) 
Infant mortality (WDI) 0.119** -0.034*** 0.027** -0.031*** 
(0.054) (0.009) (0.060) (0.008) 
Trade openness (PWT) -0.010 0.010** -0.045 0.010** 
(0.045) (0.004) (0.053) (0.005) 
Political rights (FH) -1.457 -0.072 -0.560 -0.052 
(0.924) (0.102) (1.083) (0.091) 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
(AL) 
1.903 0.069 10.564 -0.753 
(8.326) (0.690) (11.13) (0.673) 
Constant -128.9*** 23.18*** -105.154*** 22.924*** 
(31.04) (4.566) (28.66) (4.006) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 285 285 301 301 
Number of countries  68  68 





Table A8. IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by country groups 
 (dep. var. - log GDP per capita growth) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 ALL countries OECD countries Non-OECD countries 

























   
0.018*** 





   
(0.006) 




   
0.006 
   
0.026** 
   
0.001    
(0.007) 
   
(0.012) 
   
(0.011) 
















































Log of initial GDP per capita 12.8*** -0.90*** 9.263** -0.8*** 14.11** -0.8*** 20.5*** -1.31*** 3.646 -0.57*** 2.812 -0.520** 
(3.252) (0.132) (3.573) (0.132) (6.796) (0.285) (5.441) (0.327) (3.265) (0.220) (3.011) (0.215) 
Population growth (WDI) -194.25 -27.7*** -282.84 -25.89** 215.210 17.707 172.451 14.065 -448** -25.77** -431** -23.182* 
(192.0) (9.926) (184.5) (10.575) (386.72) (14.404) (331.89) (12.180) (218.19) (11.898) (211.0) (12.467) 
Infant mortality (WDI) 0.112* -0.01*** 0.012 -0.01*** -1.9*** 0.068 -1.324 -0.023 0.065 -0.01*** 0.020 -0.008** 
(0.058) (0.002) (0.065) (0.003) (0.607) (0.062) (0.867) (0.045) (0.044) (0.003) (0.047) (0.003) 
Trade openness (PWT) -0.012 0.002 -0.046 0.003 0.078 0.002 -0.022 0.005 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.001 
(0.050) (0.002) (0.055) (0.002) (0.076) (0.003) (0.079) (0.003) (0.033) (0.003) (0.039) (0.003) 
Political rights (FH) -1.085 0.016 0.037 0.005 3.70*** -0.27** 2.447 -0.116 -0.522 -0.061 0.003 -0.058 
(1.127) (0.041) (1.276) (0.037) (1.265) (0.135) (1.742) (0.107) (0.750) (0.045) (0.839) (0.039) 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
(AL) 
2.191 0.162 10.399 0.061 21.27** -0.7*** 32.45** -1.044** -15.18* 0.313 -15.97* 0.191 
(8.221) (0.293) (10.734) (0.293) (8.974) (0.259) (13.050) (0.450) (8.163) (0.548) (9.154) (0.536) 
Constant -137*** 8.63*** -109*** 8.3*** -157** 6.373** -210*** 11.1*** -109*** 6.706*** -103*** 6.35*** 
(32.428) (1.140) (30.525) (1.150) (72.822) (3.077) (59.070) (3.044) (26.107) (1.661) (25.162) (1.677) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 236 236 249 249 124 124 133 133 112 112 116 116 
R-squared   0.256   0.269   0.406   0.354   0.378   0.404 





Table A9. OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by country groups  
(controlling for other fiscal decentralization variable) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 ALL countries OECD countries Non-OECD countries 


























Expenditure decentralization  -0.023 0.80*** -0.256  0.015 0.704**
* 
-0.033  0.029 0.90*** 1.899 
 (0.076) (0.070) (0.318)  (0.016) (0.081) (0.053)  (0.145) (0.059) (4.681) 
Revenue decentralization 0.90*** 0.043  0.337 0.82*** 0.005  0.082 0.88*** 0.012  -2.056 
(0.076) (0.075)  (0.381) (0.157) (0.015)  (0.082) (0.068) (0.137)  (5.168) 
Geographic fragmentation index 0.076  0.270  0.314  0.156  0.505**  0.015  
(0.263)  (0.297)  (0.473)  (0.352)  (0.217)  (0.194)  
Log country size 0.812  0.553  2.635**  -0.482  1.219**  0.089  
(0.652)  (0.685)  (1.035)  (0.938)  (0.548)  (0.476)  
Log of initial GDP per capita 1.995 -1.88*** 1.044 -2.26*** -3.232 -2.09*** 12.5*** -3.016** -0.827 -1.454** 1.611 1.843 
(1.455) (0.431) (1.447) (0.699) (6.017) (0.394) (4.347) (1.223) (1.152) (0.631) (1.128) (7.937) 
Population growth (WDI) -64.616 -64.8*** -17.874 -64.25** 124.717 -4.025 -3.748 -7.104 -240** -40.240 147.62* 277.716 
(102.9) (22.419) (81.73) (25.975) (216.9) (27.763) (201.8) (30.400) (96.49) (41.304) (79.95) (757.42) 
Infant mortality (WDI) 0.041** -0.03*** -0.016 -0.021 -0.283 -0.027 -0.511 0.018 0.021 -0.022** -0.003 -0.027 
(0.021) (0.009) (0.024) (0.013) (0.428) (0.114) (0.457) (0.119) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.030) 
Trade openness (PWT) 0.011 0.008** -0.018 0.021 0.075* 0.007** -0.060 0.014* 0.013 0.011 -0.015 -0.021 
(0.024) (0.004) (0.025) (0.016) (0.038) (0.004) (0.044) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.082) 
Political rights (FH) -0.653* -0.091 0.208 -0.180 1.068 -0.475 0.388 -0.499 -0.65** -0.175 0.372 0.647 
(0.349) (0.097) (0.349) (0.180) (0.820) (0.350) (0.924) (0.347) (0.293) (0.143) (0.321) (2.269) 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
(AL) 
-9.21** -0.253 10.95** -3.883 -4.776 -1.261** 17.50** -2.878 -6.5*** 1.043 3.384 8.064 
(3.736) (1.129) (4.843) (5.398) (8.494) (0.504) (8.288) (2.013) (2.384) (1.678) (2.603) (15.935) 
Constant -11.460 19.7*** -20.843 23.1*** 22.328 20.2*** -120*** 28.58** -5.730 16.2*** -15.079 -14.226 
(17.55) (3.730) (16.32) (6.724) (65.80) (4.127) (42.827) (11.534) (12.77) (5.230) (13.11) (72.109) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 280 280 280 280 138 138 138 138 142 142 142 142 
R-squared  0.309  -0.268  0.496  0.420  0.426  -6.053 





Table A10. IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by country groups (10-year averages) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 ALL countries OECD countries Non-OECD countries 
 Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Dec. 





















Expenditure decentralization  0.034    0.04***    0.049   
 (0.024)    (0.012)    (0.031)   
Revenue decentralization    0.034*    0.09***    0.052** 
   (0.020)    (0.035)    (0.024) 
Geographic fragmentation index 1.20***  1.39***  0.941  0.761  2.21***  2.35***  
(0.444)  (0.508)  (0.807)  (0.714)  (0.395)  (0.421)  
Log country size 4.15***  4.47***  5.45***  3.373**  5.02***  6.07***  
(0.924)  (0.977)  (1.777)  (1.557)  (0.816)  (0.744)  
Log of initial GDP per capita 0.00*** -0.000** 0.00*** -0.000** 0.00*** -0.00** 0.00*** -0.00** 0.00*** -0.000* 0.00*** -0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population growth (WDI) -5612*** -23.416 -535*** -38.106 232.107 50.516* 84.365 77.588* -573*** -42.080 -527** -64.90** 
(176.991) (33.598) (173.95) (25.644) (534.3) (27.904) (455.6) (44.148) (162.84) (37.592) (207.07) (26.740) 
Infant mortality (WDI) 0.054 -0.02*** -0.010 -0.02*** -0.78** 0.19*** -0.78** 0.24*** 0.102** -0.02*** 0.026 -0.02*** 
(0.063) (0.007) (0.058) (0.006) (0.372) (0.034) (0.359) (0.053) (0.050) (0.007) (0.058) (0.006) 
Trade openness (PWT) -0.010 0.010** -0.009 0.009** 0.061 0.01*** -0.015 0.02*** 0.009 0.012* 0.022 0.010 
(0.046) (0.005) (0.049) (0.005) (0.074) (0.003) (0.072) (0.004) (0.036) (0.007) (0.041) (0.007) 
Political rights (FH) -1.496* 0.100 -0.104 0.208 2.328** -0.69** 1.806 -0.464 -0.817 -0.140 -0.295 0.012 
(0.902) (0.135) (1.167) (0.136) (0.928) (0.294) (1.130) (0.363) (0.926) (0.187) (1.199) (0.167) 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
(AL) 
3.048 -0.484 7.978 -1.070 18.70** -1.4*** 29.16** -3.30** -13.724 0.102 -13.478 -0.460 
(7.861) (0.777) (9.996) (0.745) (9.192) (0.493) (11.60) (1.398) (8.472) (1.340) (10.188) (1.208) 
Constant -30.284 2.52*** -44.9** 2.81*** -41.440 0.795 -42.741 1.032 -69.7*** 3.82*** -75*** 3.69*** 
(19.283) (0.579) (20.633) (0.616) (44.02) (0.614) (37.57) (1.396) (17.087) (0.933) (19.251) (0.970) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 150 150 156 156 69 69 72 72 81 81 84 84 
R-squared  0.362  0.441  0.418  0.274  0.495  0.574 





Table A11. IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by country groups (Only GFI as an IV) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 ALL countries OECD countries Non-OECD countries 
 Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Dec. 
VARIABLES 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 1st Stage 
2nd 
Stage 
Expenditure decentralization  -0.090    -0.051    0.124   
 (0.081)    (0.052)    (0.125)   
Revenue decentralization    -0.122    -0.176    0.384 
   (0.117)    (0.678)    (0.487) 
Geographic fragmentation 
index 
-0.296  -0.276  -0.411  -0.100  0.261  0.175  
(0.187)  (0.211)  (0.349)  (0.398)  (0.234)  (0.268)  




-0.455 20.220** -0.437 23.16*** 1.972 7.835* -2.217* 7.636** -4.120 
(3.499) (1.240) (3.747) (1.361) (9.246) (1.426) (6.129) (15.992) (4.466) (1.239) (3.818) (3.968) 
Population growth (WDI) -117.507 -74.7*** -211.384 -95.67** -157.960 -16.511 -72.516 -13.666 -24.907 -38.575 4.341 -44.726 
(183.535) (26.375) (180.009) (48.219) (488.346) (34.793) (394.024) (92.153) (241.923) (38.703) (236.753) (76.538) 
Infant mortality (WDI) 0.153*** -0.011 0.056 -0.018 -2.61*** -0.216 -1.763** -0.502 0.142*** -0.035* 0.114** -0.056 
(0.055) (0.018) (0.066) (0.017) (0.783) (0.184) (0.854) (1.224) (0.050) (0.020) (0.048) (0.055) 




-0.014 -0.046 0.007 -0.087 -0.006 -0.19*** 0.028 -0.22*** 0.089 
(0.038) (0.011) (0.038) (0.019) (0.081) (0.007) (0.065) (0.054) (0.053) (0.027) (0.053) (0.113) 
Political rights (FH) -0.921 -0.212 0.314 -0.012 4.195** -0.147 2.572 0.324 0.097 -0.234* 1.189 -0.564 
(1.184) (0.175) (1.446) (0.251) (1.775) (0.414) (1.814) (1.873) (1.053) (0.137) (1.225) (0.661) 
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (AL) 
7.351 0.698 16.436 1.624 23.427* 0.270 35.04*** 5.582 -13.568 1.800 -14.940 4.879 
(9.087) (1.002) (10.144) (1.651) (13.879) (1.551) (13.222) (23.531) (11.816) (1.893) (11.948) (6.702) 
Constant -
83.47*** 
9.576 -52.769 11.068 -136.523 7.228 -188.*** -12.627 -50.824 20.7*** -45.171 29.941 
(31.795) (8.899) (35.472) (9.741) (95.915) (12.490) (67.727) (133.48) (34.884) (7.989) (31.867) (21.769) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 285 285 301 301 138 138 147 147 147 147 154 154 
R-squared  -0.032  -0.193  0.280  -0.491  0.325  -0.885 






Table A12. IV OLS estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by country groups  
(only log country size as an IV) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 ALL countries OECD countries Non-OECD countries 
 Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Revenue Dec. Expenditure Dec. Dec. 
VARIABLES 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Expenditure decentralization  0.010    0.010    -0.013   
 (0.019)    (0.011)    (0.087)   
Revenue decentralization    0.007    0.025    -0.062 
   (0.021)    (0.023)    (0.078) 
Log country size 1.986***  2.092***  3.109***  1.633  0.724  1.181*  
(0.511)  (0.519)  (1.074)  (1.217)  (0.577)  (0.605)  








8.226** -1.079 7.487** -0.613 
(3.407) (0.477) (3.738) (0.472) (7.920) (0.337) (5.739) (0.468) (4.148) (0.956) (3.535) (0.938) 




130.632 -5.449 90.310 2.167 -61.219 -40.416 -54.852 -39.952 
(185.763) (23.066) (161.445) (26.088) (372.06) (27.350) (348.999) (23.134) (246.44) (32.293) (223.929) (44.595) 




-1.96*** -0.053 -1.440* -0.143 0.111* -0.017 0.070 -0.010 
(0.063) (0.009) (0.070) (0.008) (0.679) (0.120) (0.813) (0.099) (0.059) (0.016) (0.061) (0.015) 
Trade openness (PWT) -0.11*** 0.007* -0.15*** 0.005 -0.034 0.007* -0.095* 0.009*** -0.2*** -0.001 -0.23*** -0.016 
(0.035) (0.004) (0.035) (0.004) (0.064) (0.004) (0.056) (0.003) (0.052) (0.022) (0.055) (0.022) 
Political rights (FH) -0.981 -0.106 0.023 -0.043 3.092** -0.432 1.863 -0.221 0.045 -0.213 0.844 -0.034 
(1.078) (0.098) (1.311) (0.101) (1.444) (0.354) (1.618) (0.285) (1.075) (0.166) (1.303) (0.237) 
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (AL) 
8.306 0.225 16.646* -0.244 26.006** -0.974** 37.16*** -1.355* -8.907 0.281 -11.558 -1.338 





-116.302 18.08*** -171*** 27.254**
* 
-41.560 14.77** -31.892 12.649* 
(32.567) (4.091) (36.156) (4.095) (77.657) (3.536) (58.912) (4.127) (35.121) (6.090) (31.543) (6.561) 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time period dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 285 285 301 301 138 138 147 147 147 147 154 154 
R-squared  0.312  0.376  0.491  0.510  0.370  0.342 
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses, stars reflect the significant levels - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
